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ABSTRACT
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Creativity is increasing in value worldwide, but the processes underlying various
creative abilities remain ambiguous. The most frequently used assessments of creativity
(i.e., divergent thinking tasks; creative problem-solving tasks) differ in surface features
and are also rarely examined together. These inconsistencies, in addition to mixed
findings in the literature, have caused considerable debate among creativity researchers
concerning the particular roles of independent or dual processes that lead to success on
different creativity tests. The present study expounded upon these mixed findings using a
factor analytic method. The results indicated that individual differences in working
memory and fluency ability impact performance on divergent thinking and creative
problem-solving tasks, but to differing degrees. These results are discussed as supporting
a dual-process view of creative thinking.
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INTRODUCTION
A study conducted by IBM (2010) found that 60% of CEOs rated creativity as the
single most important characteristic to possess in order to be successful within the
domain of business, especially for individuals in leadership positions. Although this
investigation sheds light on the importance of creativity specifically in the workplace, the
ability to think creatively is increasing in value in other domains as well. With the everincreasing desire for creativity in modern culture, it is becoming progressively necessary
to better understand the specific processes that contribute to different creative behaviors,
such as creative problem solving and creative idea generation.
The creativity literature overall tends to diverge in how creative thinking is
defined and assessed. In 1956, Guilford developed his Structure-of-Intellect model that
included creativity as an important factor. Later, he coined the terms convergent thinking
and divergent thinking to refer to the two different types of mental processes that
contribute to intelligence (Guilford, 1959; 1967). Convergent thinking refers to the
processes that are active when deducing a single correct solution to a goal-directed
problem. In contrast, divergent thinking refers to the mental processes that are active
when an individual induces and generates multiple correct ideas or solutions to a
problem. Although Guilford believed that both types of thinking contributed to
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intelligence, he primarily viewed convergent thinking as analytic and divergent thinking
as creative.
Soon afterwards, Wallach and Kogan (1965) began exploring divergent and
convergent thinking in experimental paradigms, which led to the widespread use of
different types of assessments to measure creativity. Within the realm of creativity in
particular, convergent thinking is often assessed via creative problem-solving tasks
because they have a single correct answer. In addition to classical insight problems (e.g.,
Ash & Wiley, 2006), one of the most frequently used assessments of convergent thinking
is the Remote Associates Test (RAT; Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003; Mednick, 1962).
This particular task requires a solver to generate a word that combines with each one of
three cue words to form a compound word or phrase. For example, if the cue words are
cottage, swiss, and cake, the correct answer is cheese because it can combine with each of
the three cues to form cottage cheese, swiss cheese, and cheesecake. Generally, when
creative problems are first attempted, solvers initially misrepresent the problem, leading
them to experience a period of impasse, at which point the solver recognizes that the
incorrect problem representation will not lead to the solution. To overcome this impasse,
the solver must restructure the initial problem representation into a new one that actually
includes the path to the correct solution. When the solution to an insight problem is
uncovered, solvers often report feeling surprised (i.e., Aha!), suggesting that the process
of restructuring may lie largely outside of the control of consciousness (Metcalfe &
Wiebe, 1987). Because the correct solution to insight problems must be deduced,
Wallach and Kogan (1965) suggested that convergent thinking (even in reference to
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creative problems) requires attentional control processes that guide the solver to the
correct solution.
In contrast to convergent thinking, divergent thinking is often assessed with tests
that allow individuals to make multiple correct responses according to a particular
prompt. These tests are intended to reflect more closely the processes that would
contribute to the generation of ideas in real-world situations. Indeed, performance on
these tasks predicts creative achievements and behaviors quite well (Kounious &
Beeman, 2014; Nusbaum, Silvia, & Beaty, 2014). The most widely used assessments of
divergent thinking are included in the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT;
Torrance, 2008). An example of a divergent thinking problem is the Alternate Uses Task
(also known as the Unusual Uses Task). The Alternate Uses Task was first developed by
Wallach & Kogan (1965), and it prompts solvers to generate as many alternative or
unusual uses for a common object, such as a brick or a newspaper, as they can within a
limited time period (generally two minutes). Since Wallach and Kogan (1965) suggested
that convergent thinking is guided by attentional control processes, they made the
opposite argument for divergent thinking, suggesting that these tasks instead draw upon
associative processes. Thus, success on divergent thinking tasks would be driven by the
ability to retrieve increasingly remote associations from memory. In the problem-solving
literature, followers of this associative theory of creativity (Bowden, Jung-Beeman,
Fleck, & Kounios, 2005; Mednick, 1962) occasionally diverge from Wallach and
Kogan’s distinction between convergent and divergent thinking. Rather, they explain the
role of associative processes in creative problem solving as a search through the problem
space in which associates related to a particular cue in the problem are accessed before
3

more remote associates can be accessed. As the search through the problem space
progresses, increasingly remote associates are accessed in an individual’s semantic
network through spreading activation, allowing for creative ideas and solutions to be
reached.
Wallach and Kogan’s (1965) argument that attentional control processes drive
convergent thinking and that associative processes drive divergent thinking was accepted
in the literature for many years, resulting in the development of two traditions of
creativity research. One such tradition primarily focused on creative problem solving as
creativity, and the other primarily focused on divergent thinking tasks as key to the
creative process.
Creative Problem Solving
Tasks traditionally used to measure convergent thinking, such as insight
problems, take the form of single-solution problems (Guilford, 1956) that have
historically been compared to analytic problem-solving tasks (see Weisberg, 2006, for
reviews). Research has largely focused on differences between the two in their
underlying processes and mechanisms. For example, when attempting to solve any kind
of problem, a problem representation must first be developed, which includes past
experience, information in the problem, and the possible paths to solution (Knoblich,
Ohlsson, Haider, & Rhenius, 1999; Newell & Simon, 1972; Ohlsson, 1984). Based on a
solver’s representation of the problem, they will use algorithms or heuristics (e.g., hillclimbing methods) to search the problem space in an attempt to reach a solution. Thus,
people will initially approach analytic and creative problems in the same way. However,
the processes contributing to successful problem solving diverge after these initial stages.
4

While the search through an initial problem representation reliably leads to success on
analytic problems, this is often not the case for creative problems. Instead, creative
problem solving seems to involve other processes (e.g., restructuring) that are not
required for solving analytic problems (see Figure 1). If the solver’s initial problem
representation is not appropriate for acquiring the solution, solvers must restructure their
original representation into one that allows the creative solutions to surface (Knoblich et
al., 1999; Ohlsson, 1984; see Wiley & Jarosz, 2012, for a review). Although the exact
mechanisms underlying restructuring remain uncertain, researchers have offered several
potential mechanisms that may contribute to the restructuring process, such as
opportunistic assimilation (Seifert, Meyer, Davidson, Patalano, & Yaniv, 1995),
forgetting fixation (Smith, 1994, 1995), or spreading activation in the semantic network
to remote aspects of the problem (Ohlsson, 1984, 1992, 2011). In light of these
differences, the subsequent findings from various investigations seem to point to the
involvement of both convergent and divergent processes in contributing to successful
creative problem solving (Gilhooly, Ball, & Macchi, 2015; Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony,
& Wynn, 2007; also see Weisberg, 2006, for reviews).
In support of the associative view of creative processing in convergent thinking, it
was found that participants differentially rate their progress towards solution throughout
the problem-solving process depending on the type of problem at hand (Metcalfe, 1986;
Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987). Whereas participants were aware of their incremental
progression towards solutions on analytic problems, they only became aware of how
close they were to solution on creative problems immediately before solving them.
Similarly, concurrent verbalization (i.e., verbal overshadowing) during problem solving
5

impacts success rates differently on insight problems than on analytic problems
(Schooler, Ohlsson, & Brooks, 1993). In particular, verbal overshadowing impairs
success rates on creative problems, but not on analytic problems. The authors interpret
these findings as evidence of unconscious activation of associates during creative
problem solving since concurrent verbalization essentially disrupted the process of
spreading activation to the correct remote associates. Together, these early investigations
of creative problem solving suggest that different processes contribute to success rates on
insight problems than those that contribute to success on analytic problems.
Other investigations have explored the particular processes underlying specific
parts of the creative problem-solving process. Ash and Wiley (2006) investigated whether
individuals use controlled-attention or associative processes during the restructuring
phase of creative problem solving. A set of classic insight problems was manipulated to
have either an expanded or restricted initial faulty search space. Problems in the
expanded search space condition included additional problem elements that solvers
would be required to include in their initial faulty representation of the problem. Thus, in
the restricted search space condition, the restructuring phase was essentially isolated from
controlled search processes by limiting the number of elements to be incorporated in the
solver’s problem representation. In this way, impasse was reached much sooner in a
restricted search space than with an expanded search space. When compared to measures
of attentional control (measured with working memory tasks), the results indicated that
controlled attention did not predict success on problems that isolated the restructuring
phase, whereas controlled attention did predict success on problems that allowed for an
initial search through an expanded problem space. Ultimately, these findings provide
6

strong support for a dual-process account of creativity, with the ability to control
attention benefitting the initial search phase of problem solving, and associative processes
benefitting the restructuring phase.
Additional evidence indicates that a lack of attentional control is sometimes
beneficial for creative problem solving. For example, older adults, who are thought to
have lower levels of attentional control, are better than younger adults at noticing external
clues in the environment, enabling them to perform more successfully on a creative
problem-solving task (Hasher, Zacks, & May, 1999). Congruent with attentional deficits
in aging, the role of alcohol consumption and brain lesions in successful problem solving
have also been explored because these factors induce a state of lowered attentional
control. Studies have shown that drunk participants are better at solving creative
problems than their sober counterparts (Benedek, Panzierer, Jauk, & Neubauer, 2017;
Jarosz, Colflesh, & Wiley, 2012), and patients with lesions in the lateral prefrontal cortex
(i.e., a brain region related to attention; Nagahama et al., 1996; Stuss et al., 2000) solve
insight problems better than their healthy counterparts (Reverberi, Toraldo, D’agostini, &
Skrap, 2005). Finally, individuals who are awoken from REM sleep, and thus in a state of
disorientation and diffuse attention, are also better at solving problems creatively than
those who are awoken from non-REM sleep (Walker, Liston, Hobson, & Stickgold,
2002).
Taken together, these findings support the associative view of creative problem
solving because a lack of controlled attention appears to promote solution rates on insight
problems, but not on analytic problems. However, it is also important to recognize that
controlled attention is necessary during the search through the problem space. Because
7

impasse is reached only once the solver has acknowledged that they have exhaustively
searched through the available pathways in the current problem space, attentional
resources necessarily play a role during this search phase. Even after restructuring,
solvers may still require attentional resources to search the pathways in the new problem
representation that will lead to solution. In this way, the evidence points toward a
combined, dual-process account of creative problem solving (Benedek & Jauk, 2017;
Gilhooly et al., 2007; Lee & Therriault, 2013). It would appear as though controlled
attention assists the problem solver throughout the initial (or restructured) faulty search
phase, but afterwards, associative processes ultimately allow the problem solver to
unconsciously restructure the faulty representation into a new one and solve the problem.
Divergent Thinking
A separate perspective of creative thinking is the controlled-attention theory
(Beaty & Silvia, 2012, 2013; Beaty, Silvia, Nusbaum, Jauk, & Benedek, 2014; Benedek
& Jauk, 2017; Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony, & Wynn, 2007; Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011).
This theory proposes that when individuals produce novel ideas or solutions to problems,
they draw upon executive processes (specifically controlled attention) to systematically
map and search through various goal states that lead to some end goal. Contrary to
Wallach and Kogan’s (1965) argument that only associative processes underlie success
on divergent thinking tests, a large body of more recent evidence within the divergent
thinking literature seems to support an interactive role between controlled-attention
processes and associative processes in contributing to successful creative idea generation.
Divergent thinking tests are most often scored according to some variation of the
following: the total number of items produced (fluency), the number of categories
8

produced (flexibility or switching), the number of items produced within a category
(clustering), and the number of unique or original items produced (originality). Although
these are all frequently used measures of divergent thinking, it has been pointed out that
many of these scores confound with each other (Clark & Mirels, 1970; Hocevar &
Michael, 1979; Silvia, 2008). Thus, the likelihood that someone will frequently switch
between categories or provide many unique responses is dependent upon the total number
of responses that the individual provides. Due to these confounding factors, scores on
divergent thinking tests inherently become similar to tests of verbal fluency. Although
divergent thinking and verbal fluency have been treated very differently in the literature,
the surface similarities between them lend a starting point for acquiring a better
understanding of the underlying processes that drive performance on each of these types
of tests.
Verbal fluency tasks, traditionally used as measures of memory retrieval, prompt
participants to provide as many responses related to a particular cue (e.g., animals; letter
F) as possible in two to three minutes (Rosen & Engle, 1997; Troyer & Moscovitch,
2006). The cue in a verbal fluency test acts as the start of an effortful and strategic search
through the problem space, allowing for the retrieval of relevant concepts (Moscovitch,
1995). Within the individual differences literature, investigations with working memory
have contributed to a better understanding of the processes and mechanisms that underlie
verbal fluency performance. For example, it has been shown that controlled attention is
required for encoding of information, but retrieval of information from memory can
occur either strategically or automatically (Craik, Govoni, Naveh-Benjamin & Anderson,
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1996), hinting towards an interaction between associative and executive processes in
verbal fluency performance.
Rosen and Engle (1997) have expanded upon Craik and colleagues’ (1996)
findings by exploring the contributing role of working memory in the strategic retrieval
of concepts from memory. Across four experiments, they found that individuals with
higher working memory consistently produced more responses on a verbal fluency task
than did individuals with lower working memory, suggesting that working memory
indeed plays a role in successful verbal fluency performance. However, when participants
were required to complete a verbal fluency task, monitor for repetitions, and also perform
a concurrent attention-demanding task (i.e., digit tracking), only individuals with highworking memory spans decreased in fluency scores as compared to a control condition.
In contrast, individuals with low-working memory spans produced the same number of
animal names, regardless of whether they were also required to attend to a concurrent
attention-demanding task. These results provide evidence that individuals with lower
working memory use automatic retrieval processes due to their insufficient attentional
resources. On the other hand, individuals with higher working memory show decreases in
performance when under concurrent attentional load because they no longer have the
additional attentional resources to allocate to a strategic search through memory.
Ultimately, evidence in the verbal fluency literature indicates that verbal fluency tasks
draw upon controlled and associative processes, suggesting that convergent and divergent
processes both play a role in successful verbal fluency performance.
Similar patterns of results have also been demonstrated in the divergent thinking
literature. For example, it has repeatedly been found that the rate of unique responses
10

increases as the amount of time spent on a divergent thinking task increases. Mednick
(1962), an associative theorist, suggests that this phenomenon is likely to occur because
common associates to the cue will be activated before the activation spreads to more
remote associates available within the problem space. However, evidence from several
investigations again appears to support an interactive role of both associative and
controlled-attention processes in successful divergent thinking performance.
A recent study challenged Mednick’s (1962) associative view by investigating the
contributions of associative and controlled-attention processes in a ten-minute divergent
thinking task (i.e., unusual uses; Beaty & Silvia, 2012). Because fluid intelligence is
driven by executive, attention-demanding processes (Kane et al., 2004), fluid intelligence
was used as the measure of attentional control (Beaty & Silvia, 2012). The results
indicated that fluid intelligence significantly moderates the serial increase of unique
responses in divergent thinking tasks—the higher an individual’s fluid reasoning skills,
the lower the serial effect will be. More generally, individuals with high levels of fluid
intelligence produced more creative ideas from the beginning to the end of the ten
minutes. Because this investigation found a moderating effect of an executive ability that
correlates highly with controlled attention processes, the results also promote a dualprocess account of divergent thinking in contributing to this serial effect. Whereas
spreading activation may play a role in the activation of remote associates that contribute
to creative idea generation, it would seem as though controlled attention also plays a
substantial role in performance on divergent thinking tests. Drawing from the findings in
the verbal fluency literature, controlled attention processes may also be particularly
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important for implementing strategies and managing interference from old responses
during idea generation.
Although verbal fluency and divergent thinking tasks have traditionally been used
for different purposes in the literature, the surface similarities between these tasks may
actually reflect a larger proportion of shared processes than has traditionally been
considered. This idea is reinforced by the research discussed above. The findings among
these investigations suggest that divergent thinking and verbal fluency draw upon both
divergent and convergent processes in the development and generation of ideas.
Recently, researchers have begun investigating the underlying processes involved in
divergent thinking, verbal fluency, and insight problem solving to expand upon the
growing evidence suggesting that dual-processes are involved in creative thinking
(Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony, & Wynn, 2007; Lee & Therriault, 2013; Nusbaum &
Silvia, 2011).
Dual-Processes in Creative Thinking
It was not until Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony, and Wynn (2007) first suggested a
dual-process theory of creative thinking that the executive and associative lines of
creativity research began to re-converge. Dual-process theories (Benedek & Jauk, 2017;
Gilhooly et al., 2007; Lee & Therriault, 2013) propose that individuals draw upon both
associative and controlled attention processes to actively engage in creative thinking.
Despite creativity researchers’ increasing support for dual process theories of creativity,
the lack of communication between the divergent thinking domain of creativity and the
insight problem solving domain of creativity has stymied recent attempts to adequately
explore these processes together. Most studies still rely upon solely insight problem
12

solving tasks or divergent thinking tasks, and rarely consider both at once. There are,
however, a few exceptions to this finding.
Nusbaum and Silvia (2011)
Unlike insight problem solving, verbal overshadowing does not alter divergent
thinking performance (Gilhooly et al., 2007), suggesting that controlled-attention
processes may play a larger role in divergent thinking than in insight problem solving. As
such, divergent thinking performance should substantially correlate with other established
cognitive mechanisms that draw upon controlled-attention, such as fluid intelligence or
working memory capacity. Instead, a meta-analysis of 21 investigations indicated a very
small positive relationship between intelligence and divergent thinking (Kim, 1958).
Skeptical of these findings, Nusbaum and Silvia (2011) proposed that these relationships
were due to the inappropriate usage of the traditional scoring methods (i.e., fluency) for
divergent thinking tasks. For this reason, they conducted a latent variable analysis to
explore the role of fluid intelligence in divergent thinking, using a revised scoring system
(the snapshot scoring method, described below; Silvia, Martin, & Nusbaum, 2009). The
results indicated that fluid intelligence significantly predicted divergent thinking both
directly and indirectly through category switching as a mediator.
Although these findings appear to provide evidence for a controlled-attention
view of divergent thinking, a closer inspection of Nusbaum and Silvia’s (2011) latent
variable model reveals some issues. First, their model depicts a fluid intelligence factor
(“Gf” in the model) that extracts variance from three lower-order factors: fluid
intelligence (“fluid IQ” in the model), strategy use, and verbal fluency. Although the
organization of this model implies that Gf and fluid IQ are distinguishable constructs, it is
13

important to note that these terms are synonymous within the intelligence literature
(Carroll, 1993). This point is especially noteworthy because the lower-order fluid IQ
factor extracts shared variance from commonly used tasks that are accepted as
assessments of Gf, but it is unclear as to why strategy use (i.e., participants identified
strategies for verbal fluency tasks) and verbal fluency would also be modeled to
contribute shared variance to the higher-order Gf factor. Without a convincing theoretical
basis for including these measures in the latent variable model, the Gf factor appears
considerably biased towards aspects of verbal fluency, rather than traditional measures of
Gf. It is not surprising, then, that a fluency-biased factor would also predict divergent
thinking, a relationship that the authors themselves recognized as resembling each other
too closely. Because the exact contributions from the lower-order factors to the higherorder Gf factor remain unclear, it is difficult to clearly interpret the implications of this
model.
Lee and Therriault (2013)
Drawing upon Nusbaum and Silvia’s (2011) findings, Lee and Therriault (2013)
further explored the relationships between verbal fluency and divergent thinking by also
including comparisons to convergent thinking. Much like Nusbaum and Silvia (2011),
Lee and Therriault (2013) were also concerned with the similarities between divergent
thinking and verbal fluency but were more interested in understanding how fluid
intelligence and working memory contributed to success on divergent thinking,
convergent thinking (i.e., insight problem solving), and verbal fluency tasks.
Because Nusbaum and Silvia (2011) did not directly test the relationship between
verbal fluency and divergent thinking, Lee and Therriault (2013) first aimed to examine
14

the contribution of verbal fluency scores to success on divergent and convergent thinking
tasks. Thus, a latent variable model was developed, in which verbal fluency predicted
both divergent thinking and convergent thinking. The results showed that divergent
thinking and convergent thinking emerged as unique forms of creativity. In addition,
verbal fluency significantly predicted both types of creative thinking, but it was a
stronger predictor of convergent thinking than of divergent thinking. Because they
hypothesized that fluid intelligence would be a direct predictor of verbal fluency and that
working memory would be an indirect predictor of verbal fluency through fluid
intelligence, a second model was developed and analyzed. In their second model,
working memory served as a predictor of verbal fluency through fluid intelligence; verbal
fluency again served as a direct predictor of convergent and divergent thinking, as in their
first model. In this larger model, verbal fluency again correlated more highly with
convergent thinking than with divergent thinking, and working memory and fluid
intelligence also significantly contributed indirectly and directly (respectively) to verbal
fluency. These findings suggest that the underlying processes involved in verbal fluency
also play a large role in convergent thinking, but not as much in divergent thinking.
Despite the growing body of evidence that has begun to expose the similarities between
verbal fluency and divergent thinking, Lee and Therriault’s (2013) models showed that
verbal fluency predicted convergent thinking significantly more strongly than divergent
thinking.
The findings from Lee and Therriault’s (2013) investigation suggest a dualprocess account of creative thinking because verbal fluency, which is known to be related
to working memory (Rosen & Engle, 1997), predicted both divergent and convergent
15

thinking, albeit to different extents. Similar to Nusbaum and Silvia’s (2011) models,
issues also arise in the models that Lee and Therrialt (2013) developed, which may lead
to problems in interpreting these results at face-value. Because they did not provide factor
loadings of the tasks onto the latent factors, the descriptive statistics must be considered
closely, as they hint towards what the model truly represents. For example, descriptive
statistics indicated that the three convergent thinking tasks included in the model did not
appropriately correlate with each other. Because the convergent thinking factor was
modeled to extract shared variance from three uncorrelated tasks, it seems unlikely that
the shared variance being extracted into this factor represents the underlying processes
that contribute to creative problem solving. In addition, two of the three convergent
thinking tasks only consisted of a single problem. One task was an eight-letter, onesolution anagram (calendar) that participants had to unscramble. The other task was a
variation of the highly difficult nine-dot problem that most people do not successfully
solve (Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2004). Because each of these tasks only included one
problem, performance variability was essentially eliminated in two out of the three
convergent thinking tasks. Taking into consideration that none of the convergent thinking
tasks correlated with each other, in addition to the lack of variance in the convergent
thinking factor, interpretations of the results found in this investigation likewise remain
unclear.
DeYoung, Flanders, and Peterson (2008)
DeYoung, Flanders, and Peterson (2008) expanded upon Gilhooly and
colleagues’ (2007) theory that creative problem solving may require both divergent and
convergent thinking properties. Verbal creative problem solving performance was
16

regressed onto three measures of divergent thinking: fluency, flexibility, and originality. 1
In another regression predicting creative problem solving performance, it was found that
convergent thinking (verbal intelligence and working memory), divergent thinking
(flexibility), and breaking frame (the ability to identify a black four of hearts in the
anomalous card task; Bruner & Postman, 1949) all predicted unique variance in creative
problem solving. Together, these findings suggest that dual-processes are likely involved
in both creative problem solving and in divergent thinking. This is particularly evident
because working memory, which consists of executive processes, predicted creative
problem solving, divergent thinking, and breaking frame independently from verbal
intelligence. However, it is still unclear as to the extent to which creative problem solving
and divergent thinking each draw upon executive and/or associative processes in
contributing to creative thought.
The Present Study
Because few investigations jointly study divergent thinking and convergent
thinking, the exact contributions of controlled and associative processes to creative
thinking remain indistinct. Thus, the purpose of the proposed study is to better understand
the mechanisms and processes that underlie different forms of creative thinking. More
specifically, the proposed study used structural equation modeling (SEM) in an attempt to
address various questions that remain uncertain. First, models were developed to test the
question of whether fluency and divergent thinking tasks measure a single unitary

Upon discovering that only flexibility independently predicted performance on insight
problem solving, DeYoung et al. used only flexibility scores as the index of divergent
thinking in all subsequent analyses.
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construct, or two independent constructs (as they are treated in the literature). It has been
argued that fluency and divergent thinking tasks may reflect each other too closely, but
this question remains largely unanswered because it was either not directly tested
(Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011), or inappropriate tasks were used (Lee & Therriault, 2013).
Next, models were formed and compared to each other, in order to test whether divergent
thinking tasks also rely on shared processes with creative problem-solving tasks, and/or
whether creative problem solving also requires divergent thinking. Dependent upon these
findings, the third question to be addressed was whether working memory capacity
predicts divergent and convergent thinking differently.

Figure 1.
Model of creative problem solving (based on Knoblich et al., 1999;
Ohlsson, 1984; Wiley & Jarosz, 2012).
Brackets indicate processes that lead to success in analytic problem solving.
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METHOD
Participants and Data Screening
Data from 236 participants enrolled in general psychology at Mississippi State
University and recruited through the Psychology Research Program were obtained across
the two-day experiment. Thirty-four participants were not included in the sample because
they did not come back for the second session. Five additional participants were excluded
because they did not complete two or more of the 16 tasks, and one participant was
excluded for providing nonsensical responses on the computer tasks (e.g., random
number or letter strings) and scribbles on the paper tasks. Of the remaining participants
(N = 196; 65 males, 131 females), less than 2% of the dataset was missing due to
participants not following instructions (e.g., not circling two responses on DT tasks)
and/or technical difficulties related to the WM tasks. Missing data points were imputed in
a single data set using bootstrapped linear regression in R. These imputed values were
then inserted into the data set, and manifest variables were standardized prior to analyses.
A Mahalanobis distance analysis tested for multivariate outliers among each of the four
factors of interest (i.e., fluency, divergent thinking, creative problem solving, working
memory). There were no multivariate outliers in the sample.
It is recommended that a minimum of five participants be included per each
proposed model parameter (Hancock & Mueller, 2012). Thus, the obtained sample size
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was sufficient for appropriately conducting analyses on the most complex proposed
model. Each session lasted between an hour and an hour and a half, and participants
received a maximum of three and a half course credit hours for participation in both
sessions. Participants were awarded one and a half course credits upon completion of the
first session and two course credits upon completion of the second session. This
distribution of credit was to discourage attrition. Because several of the tasks used in this
study require an extensive knowledge of the English language, only native Englishspeaking individuals were included as participants in this investigation.
Materials
Divergent Thinking Tasks
All of the divergent thinking tasks were conducted using paper and pencil.
Participants completed two verbal divergent thinking tasks (unusual uses; consequences)
and two figural divergent thinking tasks (circles; incomplete figures). For these tasks,
written instructions emphasized that creative or unique responses are desired (Silvia,
Martin & Nusbaum, 2009). The divergent thinking tasks were scored for fluency and
originality. Fluency was measured by simply summing the total number of responses
provided for each task. Originality was initially assessed using the top-two scoring
method (adapted from the consensual assessment technique; Amabile, 1982), according
to the procedures outlined by Silvia, Martin, and Nusbaum (2009) and Silvia et al.
(2008). This method requires participants to circle their top two most creative responses
after completing a divergent thinking task. Afterwards, several subjective judges rate
each person’s top responses on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 being not creative at all and 5
being very creative. The judges’ ratings are then averaged into a single creativity score
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for each individual. The top-two scoring method has begun to gain traction in the
creativity literature because it reduces the risk of confounds between fluency and
originality scores. However, this particular method did not produce a divergent thinking
factor with strong factor loadings, so an alternative scoring method was used. The
snapshot scoring method (Silvia et al., 2008) was derived from the same vein as the toptwo scoring method and also aims to reduce the risk of confounding scores. The snapshot
scoring method requires subjective judges to provide a single rating on a scale from 1 to
5, representing a holistic view of each participant’s entire set of responses. Inter-rater
reliabilities were calculated using Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951) and are displayed
in Table 1. The snapshot scoring method produced stronger factor loadings and was,
therefore, used as the scoring method for all stages of analysis.
Unusual Uses Task. The unusual uses task used modified materials and
procedures from Guilford, Merrifield, and Wilson (1958). The Unusual Uses task
prompted participants to list as many unusual or alternative uses for a newspaper as they
could in three minutes. After completing the task, participants circled their two most
creative responses (by their own judgment) before moving on to the next task.
Consequences Task. The consequences task used modified materials and
procedures from DeYoung, Flanders, and Peterson (2008) and Torrance (1974).
Participants were prompted to list as many consequences or implications of all humans
having the ability to flap their arms and fly within three minutes. After completing the
task, participants circled their two most creative responses (by their own judgment)
before moving on to the next task.
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Circles Task. The circles task used modified materials and procedures from
Torrance (2008). Participants were provided with a sheet of 24 blank circles, and they
used the circles to draw as many objects or pictures as possible within five minutes. After
completing the task, participants circled their two most creative responses (by their own
judgment) before moving on to the next task.
Incomplete Figures Task. The incomplete figures task used modified materials
and procedures from Torrance (2008). This task provided participants with a sheet of nine
individual squares, with each square consisting of differently formed lines and shapes.
Participants used the incomplete shapes to draw as many objects or pictures as possible
within five minutes. After completing the task, participants circled their two most
creative responses (by their own judgment) before moving on to the next task.
Fluency Tasks
All of the fluency tasks were conducted using paper and pencil. Participants
completed two verbal fluency tasks (letter fluency; category fluency) and two figural
fluency tasks (design fluency; Ruff figural fluency). Following typical instructions for
these tasks (i.e., because fluency tasks are not intended to be creative), the instructions
emphasized the quantity of responses over quality or uniqueness of responses. These
tasks were scored only for fluency.
Letter Fluency Task. The letter fluency task used modified materials and
procedures from Borkowski, Benton, and Spreen (1967), Lee and Therriault (2013), and
Nusbaum and Silvia (2011). The letter fluency task requires participants to generate as
many words as possible that start with the letter F within three minutes.
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Category Fluency Task. The category fluency task used modified materials and
procedures from Benton and Hamsher (1978), Lee and Therriault (2013), Nusbaum and
Silvia (2011), and Rosen and Engle (1997). The category fluency task requires
participants to generate as many animal names as possible within three minutes.
Design Fluency Task. The design fluency task used modified materials and
procedures from Jones-Gotman & Milner (1977) and Demakis and Harrison (1997). This
task requires participants to generate as many un-namable designs as possible using only
four lines. Participants had three minutes to complete the task.
Ruff Figural Fluency Task. The Ruff figural fluency task used modified
materials and procedures from Ruff (1996). Participants were presented with a sheet of
35 dot matrices that are arranged in a five by seven array. Participants connected the dots
within each unit in as many different ways as possible within a three-minute time period.
Convergent Thinking Tasks
The convergent thinking tasks were conducted via desktop computers or paper
and pencil. Participants completed two verbal convergent thinking tasks (anagrams;
verbal Rebus puzzles) and two figural convergent thinking tasks (figural Rebus puzzles;
classic insight). Accuracy and response times were recorded for all items within each
task.
Anagram Task. The anagram task used modified materials and procedures from
Gilhooly (1978) and was presented via computer. Anagrams are a commonly used
creative task that require participants to unscramble a series of letters into the correct
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word or phrase. The anagram task included 30 five-letter, one-solution anagrams as
experimental items and three anagrams as practice items. Items varied across a range of
difficulty. Participants first completed the practice items to become accustomed to the
procedure before completing the experimental items. Participants had a maximum of 30
seconds to solve each problem but were instructed to press the spacebar if they solved the
problem before the allotted 30 seconds. Participants then entered their responses into a
response box on another slide and pressed ‘Enter’ to continue to the next problem.
Verbal Rebus Puzzle Task. This task used modified materials and procedures
from MacGregor and Cunningham (2008; 2009) and was presented via computer. Rebus
puzzles are a commonly used creative task that require participants to use visual and
spatial clues of verbal information to uncover a common idiom or phrase. The verbal
Rebus puzzle task included 24 experimental problems and 3 practice problems.
Participants first completed the practice problems, and then completed the experimental
problems. They had a maximum of 30 seconds to solve each problem. If they solved the
problem before it timed out, they pressed the spacebar. They then entered the answer into
a free-response box and pressed ‘Enter’ to move on to the next problem.
Figural Rebus Puzzle Task. Figural Rebus puzzles require participants to use
visually and spatially represented figures within an image to uncover a common idiom or
phrase. Similar to the verbal Rebus puzzle task, the figural Rebus puzzle task was
presented via computer. This task included 25 experimental items and 3 example items,
and it followed the same procedure as the verbal Rebus puzzle task. Participants had 30
seconds to solve each problem, and they pressed the spacebar if they solved a problem
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before it timed out. Participants entered their answer into a free-response box before
moving on to the next problem.
Because a set of figural Rebus puzzles comparable to the available verbal versions
(MacGregor & Cunningham, 2008; 2009) has yet to be developed, the materials for the
figural Rebus puzzle task were designed and normed for use in the proposed study. A
large set of idioms and phrases were retrieved and compiled into a list. A team of trained
researchers drew 75 sketches of the items in that list. Much like verbal Rebus puzzles,
these sketches avoid directly interpretable depictions of the idioms, leading solvers to
initially misrepresent the problems and forcing them to restructure their original
misrepresentation to reach solution. The sketches were then converted into finalized
versions by scanning them into computerized files and tracing over the sketches in black
ink. This task was completed by a single researcher, to ensure stylistic consistency. Thus,
the final result consists of a large set of clean, digital versions of figural Rebus puzzles.
Twenty-eight of these items were selected on the basis of covering a range of difficulty in
pilot studies.
Classic Insight Task. The classic insight task was presented via paper and pencil
and used modified materials and procedures from Ash and Wiley (2006). This task
included various figural versions of classic insight problems, such as matchstick
arithmetic problems (Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, & Rhenius, 1999), Katona squares
problems (Katona, 1940), and coin problems (Ormerod, MacGregor, & Chronicle, 2002).
This task included 6 total problems, and participants had three minutes to solve each
problem. Responses were scored for accuracy.
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Working Memory Capacity Tasks
The working memory tasks were conducted via desktop computers. Participants
completed two verbal working memory tasks (operation span; running span) and two
visual working memory tasks (symmetry span; rotation span). All of the tasks are
untimed, but they generally take 15 minutes to complete each one. Accuracy and
response times were recorded for all items within each task. Accuracy was assessed as
the number of units (e.g., letters, words, numbers) that were correctly recalled in the
appropriate serial position for each trial.
Operation Span Task. The operation span task used materials and procedures
from Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, and Engle (2005). This task required participants to
remember a series of letters, while also mentally solving math equations. Within an
individual trial, participants were shown an equation that they must solve mentally. The
next screen displayed a number, and participants indicated whether the displayed number
is the correct or incorrect answer to the equation previously presented. After making a
response, a letter was shown that the participant was instructed to remember. At the end
of each trial, participants were asked to recall all of the letters shown to them in correct
serial order. Trial length ranged from two to seven items, and the whole task included
three iterations of each trial length.
Running Span Task. The running span task used materials and procedures from
Broadway and Engle (2010). This task required participants to recall the last few letters
from a series of individually-presented letters on the computer screen without knowing
the exact number of letters that would be shown. The number of letters presented in one
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string ranged between four and nine letters, and the number of letters that participants
recalled ranged between three to six letters. The whole task included three iterations of
the letters presented and the letters to be recalled.
Symmetry Span Task. The symmetry span task used materials and procedures
from Unsworth et al. (2005). This task required participants to first decide whether an
image consisting of shaded squares in an eight by eight array was symmetrical. Next,
they were shown a four by four array that consisted of a single filled square, and
participants had to remember the location of the filled squares across the varying number
of items (between two and five) within a trial. At the end of a trial, participants clicked
the to-be-remembered squares in the correct serial order that they were presented in a
blank four-by-four array. The whole task included three iterations of each trial length.
Rotation Span Task. The rotation span task used materials and procedures from
Shah and Miyake (1996) and Kane et al. (2004). Within an individual trial, participants
first determined whether a rotated letter (G, F, or R) is either normal or mirror-reversed.
These letters were rotated at 0°, 45°, 90°, 135°, 180°, 225°, 270°, or 315°. After making a
judgment, participants were shown an arrow that was positioned at one of the previously
listed degree rotations. The arrows themselves could be either short or long, and
participants had to remember both the size and degree of rotation of the arrow. The
number of items in each trial ranged from two to five, and the whole task consisted of 12
total trials. At the end of a trial, an array of arrows (both long and short) in each degree of
rotation were displayed. Participants then clicked the to-be-remembered arrows in the
correct serial order as they were presented.
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General Procedure
Participants entered the testing room and sat at a computer. They first provided
written informed consent, and then the testing began. The experimenter loaded and
started all computerized tasks for participants. For the paper and pencil tasks, preprepared packets with randomized items were provided.
On the first day, participants completed the fluency tasks and the working
memory tasks. The fluency tasks were presented first and took approximately fifteen
minutes to complete all four. The ordering of the tasks was in a fixed random order: letter
fluency, Ruff fluency, category fluency, and design fluency. The working memory tasks
were presented next and took approximately one hour to complete. Operation span was
presented first, followed by symmetry span, running span, and rotation span.
On the second day, participants completed the convergent thinking tasks and the
divergent thinking tasks. The divergent thinking tasks (presented first) took
approximately 20 minutes to complete, and the creative problem-solving tasks took
approximately an hour. The divergent thinking tasks presented the unusual uses task first,
followed by the circles task, the consequences task, and the incomplete figures task. The
convergent thinking tasks were presented as follows: classic insight, figural Rebus
puzzles, anagrams, and verbal Rebus puzzles.
Planned Analyses
Three separate sets of analyses were proposed a priori and conducted. Each
analysis set consists of theoretically-driven models that address specific questions
regarding the underlying constructs or processes involved in creative thinking. Analysis
Set I investigates whether the surface features of divergent thinking and fluency tasks are
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indeed surface-level similarities or representative of the same construct; Analysis Set II
addresses whether divergent thinking and creative problem-solving are also
representative of the same construct. Analysis Set III investigates the role of controlled
processes (i.e., working memory) on divergent thinking and creative problem solving.
Further details about each analysis set and its respective models are provided in the
results section below. Additionally, a final analysis set consisting of unplanned models
was conducted to explore the findings that resulted from Analysis Set III.
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RESULTS
Four separate sets of analyses (Analysis Sets I-IV) were conducted to address
various questions about the underlying mechanisms and processes contributing to
individual differences in performance on common assessments of creativity. Each set of
analyses builds upon the question(s) and findings from the prior set(s). Within each
analysis set (with the exception of Analysis Set IV), models were developed a priori and
were compared against each other to obtain a better understanding of the relationships to
be addressed by each question. All proposed models are displayed in figures, where
circles represent unmeasured latent constructs, and rectangles represent observed task
performance (i.e., manifest variables). Single-headed arrows from one variable to another
indicate regressions, while double-headed arrows indicate correlations. Factor loadings
are displayed next to each manifest variable, and correlations are displayed on top of
double-headed arrows.
Most, but not all, proposed models in Analysis Sets I and II are non-nested, and
all of the proposed models in Analysis Sets III and IV are nested. Because a combination
of nested and non-nested models was considered across all analysis sets, Bayesian
information criterion (BIC) and Akaike information criterion (AIC) were used as the
goodness-of-fit indices for appropriately making comparisons across nested and nonnested models. AIC and BIC are parsimony fit indices, meaning that they value
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parsimonious (i.e., simpler) models over complex ones. AIC and BIC values are not
scaled from 0-1, so the only criterion for accepting one model over another is that smaller
values are more desirable. If the change in AIC or BIC values between two competing
models is less than two (∆AIC or ∆BIC < 2), then both models can be interpreted as
fitting the data equally well (Burnham & Anderson, 2004). Although AIC and BIC are
both parsimony fit indices, they are calculated differently, and thus, penalize model
complexity differently. For example, AIC rewards models for having fewer parameters,
regardless of sample size; BIC, on the other hand, rewards parsimony by penalizing for
increasingly large sample sizes in complex models. Consequentially, AIC and BIC can
favor different models as best-fitting. If neither metric preferred one model over another
(and/or if AIC and BIC conflicted), then the more parsimonious model was accepted as
the better-fitting model.
Although AIC and BIC indices were used to compare, accept, and reject models
throughout the analysis, the following statistics are also reported as supplemental model
fit indices: Chi-square2, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), standardized
root mean square residual (SRMR), and comparative fit index (CFI). Chi-square,
RMSEA, and SRMR indices are ‘absolute fit’ indices, which indicate how closely any
given model fits the observed data (McDonald & Ho, 2002). The chi-square statistic tests
for differences between the model’s covariance matrix and the sample data (Hooper,
Coughlan & Mullen, 2008; Hu & Bentler, 1999; Schermelleh-Engel, Moosbrugger &

Chi-square tests are used to compare model fit across nested models, but they assume that the nonstandardized covariance matrix is used (Hu & Bentler, 1999:2). Since it was necessary to impute raw
values for missing data before standardizing them, our data does not meet this assumption. AIC and BIC
were used instead of chi-square tests to compare across models, but chi-square values are reported as a
goodness-of-fit index nonetheless.
2
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Müller, 2003). The chi-square statistic is a hypothesis test, so significance values of p <
.05 indicate poor fitting models, whereas values of p > .05 indicate good fitting models.
The chi-square statistic can also be used to compare across models, albeit only nested
ones. Thus, its use was limited throughout the different analysis stages. The RMSEA
statistic compares the sample covariance matrix to an unknown population covariance
matrix (Byrne, 1998; Hooper et al., 2008). An accepted rule-of-thumb for interpreting
RMSEA values is as follows: values ≤ 0.01 indicate excellent fit; values ≤ 0.05 indicate
good fit; values ≤ 0.08 indicate acceptable fit; values ≥ 0.10 indicate poor fit
(MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996). Finally, SRMR compares the square root of
the sample covariance matrix to an unknown population covariance matrix and can be
interpreted in a similar fashion as RMSEA: SRMR values ≤ 0.08 indicate good fit. CFI,
on the other hand, is an ‘incremental fit’ index, which indicates how closely a model fits
the observed data when compared to a restrictive baseline model (Bentler, 1990; Bentler
& Bonett, 1980). CFI values ≥ 0.95 indicate good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999).
Confirmatory factor analysis was used to conduct Analysis Sets I and II, and
structural equation modeling was used to conduct Analysis Sets III and IV. All latent
variable analyses were conducted using R 3.5.0 (R Core Team, 2018). See Table 1 for
descriptive statistics and Table 2 for task correlations. Fit statistics for models across all
four analysis sets are displayed in Table 3.
Analysis Set I
A Priori Models and Predictions
The first analysis addresses the question of whether divergent thinking and verbal
fluency are unidimensional or independent constructs. Model 1A in Figure 2 loads all of
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the divergent thinking and fluency tasks onto a single construct, suggesting that it is not
only the surface features of these tasks that are similar. Rather, they are both driven by
the same underlying processes and can explain variance in both types of tasks. In
contrast, model 1B specifies divergent thinking and fluency as two independent, but
covarying, constructs—representing the way in which these variables have traditionally
been treated in the literature. It was predicted that both types of tasks would be driven by
the same underlying processes; thus, model 1A was expected to be the better-fitting
model.
Set I Results
Model fit statistics were computed for each model separately and then compared.
Model 1A demonstrated poor fit: the CFI and RMSEA criteria were not met (see Table
3). For model 1B, CFI, RMSEA, and SRMR exceeded the criteria for good fit. The AIC
and BIC values also unanimously favored model 1B, as indicated by the lower values
compared to those for model 1A. Thus, the independence model performed better in
terms of both absolute and relative fits, so model 1A is rejected and model 1B is accepted
as the best-fitting model.
Set I Discussion
Because AIC and BIC favored model 1B, this suggests that fluency and divergent
thinking are distinct, but related, constructs. Despite the initial prediction that one
construct would account for performance on both types of tests, the direct evaluation of
their relationship revealed that these tests do indeed assess different cognitive abilities.
Still, it is important to note that the fluency and divergent thinking factors are correlated
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(r = 0.63) and share over 36% of their variance. This finding highlights a critical feature
of the relationship between fluency and divergent thinking: each set of tasks draws upon
both task-specific (unique) and task-general (shared) cognitive processes.
Analysis Set II
A Priori Models and Predictions
The second set of analyses explores how the processes underlying divergent
thinking and creative problem solving interact and contribute to performance on each
type of task. Model 2A in Figure 3 depicts divergent thinking as an independent construct
from creative problem solving, representing the standard view of how these tasks are
considered in the literature. The theoretical underpinnings of this model would suggest
that divergent thinking and creative problem solving only predict unique variance in the
tasks that purport to measure these different creative constructs.
Because there is mixed, yet increasing, evidence that shared processes are
involved in creative problem solving and divergent thinking tasks, the remaining models
represent valid potential representations of the underlying processes involved in these
types of tasks. Model 2B depicts the divergent thinking factor as explaining unique
variance in the divergent thinking tasks, as well as shared variance in the creative
problem-solving tasks. This model suggests that performance on the creative problemsolving tasks requires the usage of both types of creative thinking processes, while
performance on the divergent thinking tasks only requires the usage of processes unique
to those tasks. Model 2C depicts the opposite, with the creative problem-solving factor
explaining shared variance across all tasks. This model suggests that performance on the
divergent thinking tasks, but not the creative problem-solving tasks, require both types of
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creative thinking. In each of these cases, the results would suggest that one construct
directly impacts performance on two different types of creative thinking tasks, while the
other construct only impacts performance on its respective task set.
Finally, model 2D depicts a saturated model in which variance across all creative
thinking tasks is explained by only shared processes. This model suggests that each factor
drives performance on both kinds of tasks, indicating that all creative thinking tasks
require a combination of both divergent thinking and creative problem-solving processes
to be successful. Consequentially, neither factor has a truly unique influence on either set
of manifest variables. As outlined previously, accumulating evidence suggests that
associative and controlled processes play a role in both types of creative thinking. Thus, it
was predicted that model 2D would provide the best fit to the data because it should
account for these shared processes across both task types.
Set II Results
Model fit statistics were computed for each model separately and then compared.
Initial model fits were on the lower end of the cutoff range for an acceptable fit, so
modification indices (MI) were used to help improve the overall fits of the models in this
(and following) set(s). MIs were used conservatively: only theoretically meaningful
recommendations for correlated error variances were considered, starting with the highest
MI value. For this stage of analysis, the only modification was to allow the error
variances of the verbal divergent thinking tasks to correlate (i.e., unusual uses;
consequences; MI = 9.21).
As the model fit statistics in Table 3 demonstrate, the AIC values across all
models were similar, but model 2B was favored over model 2A (∆AIC2A-2B = 2.21).
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However, BIC preferred model 2A (∆BIC2B-2A = 7.63). CFI, RMSEA, and SRMR
indicated good fit for both models. Because AIC and BIC disagreed, the simplest model
was accepted as the better-fitting model. In this case, model 2A is the most parsimonious
and is therefore accepted as the best fit in this set of competing models. Considering the
factor loadings in model 2A, the figural divergent thinking tasks loaded the most strongly
onto the divergent thinking factor, while the two Rebus puzzle tasks loaded the most
strongly onto the creative problem-solving factor. Although the factor loadings were
stronger overall for the creative problem-solving factor in models 2A and 2B, the crossloadings from the divergent thinking factor in model 2B were also strong. Taking this
into consideration, it seems as though AIC and BIC may have disagreed because of the
conflict between choosing the most parsimonious model (model 2A) and the model that
explained the most shared variance (model 2B). In the end, however, model 2A was
favored as the most parsimonious and was accepted as the best fit.
Set II Discussion
An independence model was again the best fit to the data, indicating that the
divergent thinking and creative problem-solving factors extract unique variance across
the tasks that aim to measure these abilities. Although the cross-loading models were not
the best fit to the data, the correlation between the divergent thinking and creative
problem-solving factors is strong, r = 0.61. This correlation suggests that there is still a
shared mechanism between the two constructs. Consequentially, the next set of analyses
will attempt to explain this shared variance by examining the relationship of working
memory to each of these constructs.
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Analysis Set III
A Priori Models and Predictions
In this analysis set, a working memory factor will predict the best-fitting model
from the prior set of analyses. Three models were developed to explore the relationships
between working memory, divergent thinking, and creative problem solving: in the first
model, working memory only predicts divergent thinking; in the second model, working
memory only predicts creative problem solving; in the third model, working memory
predicts both divergent thinking and creative problem solving. Each proposed model
represents a different prediction regarding the underlying mechanisms involved in
creative thinking.
Model 3A in Figure 4 suggests that the divergent thinking tasks, but not the
creative problem-solving tasks, uniquely draw upon working memory resources when
generating creative ideas. This result would be congruent with the idea that divergent
thinking tasks require the use of working memory to maintain old ideas while generating
new ones (Moscovitch, 1995; Rosen & Engle, 1997). On the other hand, model 3B
suggests that the creative problem-solving tasks, but not the divergent thinking tasks,
uniquely draw upon working memory resources when solving problems creatively. This
result would suggest that creative problem-solving tasks require the use of working
memory to systematically search through the problem space before reaching impasse
(Ash & Wiley, 2006; Ohlsson, 1984, 1992, 2011). Finally, model 3C depicts working
memory as predicting both creative problem-solving and divergent thinking. This result
would indicate that working memory plays a role in both types of creative thinking—
likely in the ways previously described for models 3A and 3B. Additionally, all three
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models allow the divergent thinking and creative problem-solving factors to correlate
(per the results of Analysis Set II). If the correlation (from model 2A) remains between
the two creative thinking factors in models 3A and 3B, then this would suggest that
divergent thinking and creative problem-solving share other processes that working
memory cannot account for. On the other hand, if model 3C is the best fit to the data, and
if the correlation between the two creative thinking factors reduces substantially, then this
would be evidence that working memory was responsible for the correlation between
them. Ultimately, the findings from this set of analyses will allow for a better
understanding of the cognitive processes that underlie creative performance.
Set III Results
Modification indices were again used to improve overall model fit by allowing
certain error variances to correlate. The modification made from the prior analysis set
was embedded into the a priori models for the current set before again calculating MIs.
The only additional modification made in this set was to allow the figural working
memory tasks’ error variances to correlate (symmetry span and rotation span; MI =
16.53).
Whereas AIC favored model 3C over model 3B (∆AIC3B-3C = 2.87), BIC preferred
models 3B and 3C equally (see Table 3; ∆BIC3C-3B = 0.41). Model 3A, in which working
memory only predicted divergent thinking, showed the worst model fit, as reflected by
the CFI, RMSEA, and SRMR values—none of these statistics met the criteria for an
acceptable model fit. Models B and C fit the data better overall, meeting all the criteria
for good fit. Models 3A and 3B indicate that working memory’s unique effect on the
divergent thinking factor was essentially nonexistent (p12 = -0.02), but it was much
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stronger on the creative problem-solving factor (p13 = 0.45). The correlation between the
two types of creative thinking also remained strong (r = 0.61) in both of these models.
Thus, AIC preferred model 3C as the best fit to the data, but BIC preferred models 3B
and 3C equally. Because AIC and BIC both agreed that model 3C represents a good fit to
the data, model 3C is accepted as the best-fitting model. These results indicate that
working memory impacts performance on both divergent thinking and creative problemsolving tests (p12 = 0.25; p13 = 0.52), with a stronger influence on creative problemsolving. Finally, the correlation between the creative thinking factors reduced only
slightly (r = 0.59) from the first two models (r = 0.61), indicating that their relationship
cannot be explained by working memory.
Set III Discussion
That model 3C was accepted as the best-fitting model suggests that working
memory plays a role in both divergent thinking and creative problem-solving tasks. The
lack of change in the correlation between divergent thinking and creative problem solving
suggests that this role is unique to each task. Prior evidence has suggested that working
memory may impact only certain portions of the creative problem-solving process (e.g.,
the search phase; Ash & Wiley, 2006). Opposing evidence suggests that fluid intelligence
is isomorphic with creative problem-solving ability, and working memory is a primary
predictor of successful creative problem-solving (Chuderski & Jastrze̜ bski, 2018).
Considering the strong relationship between working memory and creative problem
solving (p13 = 0.52), the results of the current analysis set may lend support for the
“business-as-usual” perspective, which suggests that systematic and incremental methods
or heuristics can be used to solve any kind of problem (Weisberg, 2006). Working
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memory had a weaker effect on divergent thinking (p12 = 0.23), suggesting that perhaps
divergent thinking tasks involve more associative processes that working memory cannot
account for.
Also noteworthy is that a strong relationship (r = 0.59) remains between both
creative thinking factors. This result suggests that working memory explains only a small
proportion of the shared variance between the divergent thinking and creative problemsolving factors, leaving unanswered what mechanisms account for their relationship. The
results from Analysis Set I indicated that fluency and divergent thinking are strongly
related but independent factors. In addition, Lee and Therriault (2013) reported that
fluency predicted both divergent and convergent thinking in their study, albeit more
strongly on convergent thinking. It could be the case that fluency is necessary for
reaching remote ideas or solutions, while working memory allows for a controlled search
through the activated ideas and/or solution paths. Because the remaining portion of
shared variance cannot be explained by covariances in the tasks themselves or in their
relationship with solely working memory, a fourth set of analyses was conducted to
explore this relationship. Analysis Set IV will continue to build on the findings described
so far by re-introducing fluency back into the proposed models.
Analysis Set IV
A Priori Models and Predictions
In this last analysis set, a fluency factor will predict the best-fitting model from
the prior set of analyses. Seven models were developed for the current set, in which
working memory always predicts both divergent thinking and creative problem-solving
abilities. The first four of the seven proposed models allow the fluency and working
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memory factors to correlate, while the remaining three models do not. Only the first four
models are depicted because the final three models reflect the first subset exactly, with
the exception of the oblique/orthogonal dimension of fluency and working memory
described above. All seven models were compared against each other in a single set,
mirroring the procedure of the previous analysis sets. Model fit statistics for all seven
models are reported in Table 3.
Four models were developed for the first subset of Set IV analysis, in which
fluency and working memory have an oblique relationship (see Figure 5) 3: in the first
model, fluency only correlates with working memory and does not predict success on any
other set of tasks; in the second model, fluency predicts only divergent thinking; in the
third model, working memory predicts only creative problem solving; and in the fourth
model, fluency predicts both divergent thinking and creative problem solving. Model 4A
suggests that fluency directly relates to working memory and indirectly relates to
divergent thinking and creative problem-solving abilities. Model 4B suggests that fluency
impacts performance on divergent thinking tasks, both directly and through its
relationship with working memory. Model 4C depicts the opposite of model B,
suggesting that fluency impacts creative problem-solving tasks, both directly and
indirectly through its relationship with working memory. Finally, model 4D depicts both
fluency and working memory as directly impacting performance on divergent thinking
and creative problem-solving tasks. This model would suggest that when participants

The remaining three models for this analysis set (models 4E – 4G in Table 3) were the same as models
4B, 4C, and 4D, except that fluency and working memory were depicted as having an orthogonal
relationship.
3
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solve creative problems or generate ideas, they must draw upon fluency processes and
working memory to perform successfully on those tasks.
Set IV Results
Modification indices from the prior two sets were embedded into the a priori
models for the current analysis set; MIs were again calculated and used to improve
overall fits in the current set. The additional modification made in this set was to correlate
the error variances of the figural fluency tasks (MI = 10.00). AIC and BIC both favored
model 4D (see Table 3), in which working memory and fluency both predict divergent
thinking and creative problem-solving abilities, with working memory and fluency
allowed to correlate. Even with the added modification indices, model 4D was the only
one in this set to meet the criteria for good fit across all indices—the remaining models
did not meet the CFI criteria and had mixed results for RMSEA and SRMR. This same
pattern was reflected in the second subset of models, in which fluency and working
memory were orthogonal. Thus, despite being the most complex, model 4D is accepted as
the best-fitting model.
Model 4A reflects a change in working memory’s effect on the divergent thinking
factor from model 3C (0.23 compared to 0.36) because of fluency’s relationship with
working memory. However, when the fluency factor is allowed to directly impact the
divergent thinking factor (model 4B), working memory no longer has an effect (p12 =
0.01). In addition, working memory’s direct effect on creative problem-solving remains
the same across models 4A and 4B. When fluency directly predicts creative problem
solving (model 4C), working memory’s impact on divergent thinking remains the same
as that in model 4A, but working memory’s effect on creative problem solving is cut
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almost in half (0.64 to 0.39). Finally, when fluency predicts both the divergent thinking
and the creative problem-solving factors (model 4D), it is evident that much of the shared
variance is now being explained: fluency’s impact on divergent thinking eliminates
working memory’s direct impact on divergent thinking completely and also accounts for
some of working memory’s impact on the creative problem-solving factor. Most
importantly, the relationship between divergent thinking and creative problem solving
reduces from r = 0.53 to r = 0.27, suggesting that fluency accounts for some of the
relationship between these factors. Thus, fluency plays a larger role in these abilities than
originally thought.
Set IV Discussion
Introducing fluency back into the models from Analysis Set III provides insight
into the processes that play a role in each of these types of creative thinking. Specifically,
fluency impacts performance on both types of creative tasks, above and beyond the effect
of working memory. Although working memory’s unique effect on divergent thinking is
eliminated through its relationship with fluency, working memory still has a unique effect
on the creative problem-solving factor. In addition, fluency’s impact on both tasks
explained additional shared variance between the divergent thinking and creative
problem-solving factors. Fluency’s impact on both factors resulted in the correlation
between divergent thinking and creative problem-solving to reduce by half. These
findings indicate that, though working memory plays a role in both types of creative
thinking, fluency represents a shared process between divergent thinking and creative
problem-solving tasks.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Task

Insight
Figural Rebus
Verbal Rebus
Anagrams
Design Fluency
Ruff Fluency
Letter F
Animals
Circles
Incomplete Pics
Unusual Uses
Consequences
Operation Span
Running Span
Symmetry Span
Rotation Span

M
SD Min Max Skew Kurtosis
α
0.32 0.23 0.00 1.00 0.52
-0.55
0.58
0.38 0.19 0.04 0.88 0.19
-0.75
0.80
0.47 0.17 0.00 0.83 -0.56
0.07
0.75
0.51 0.18 0.10 0.87 -0.22
-0.58
0.83
18.16 9.46 1.00 48.00 0.76
0.43
8.06 3.23 0.67 23.33 0.97
2.08
27.14 7.34 9.00 53.00 0.50
0.61
30.18 9.29 0.00 61.00 -0.07
1.53
1.93 0.97 1.00 5.00 1.01
0.16
0.82
2.24 0.90 1.00 5.00 0.29
-0.76
0.73
2.46 0.86 1.00 5.00 0.25
-0.57
0.46
2.28 0.91 1.00 5.00 0.33
-0.62
0.59
54.36 14.04 8.00 75.00 -0.97
0.62
0.84
48.53 15.55 2.00 87.00 -0.23
-0.13
0.82
26.08 8.59 1.00 41.00 -0.57
-0.11
0.82
23.88 9.29 0.00 42.00 -0.39
-0.44
0.70

Note. N = 196 for all tasks. α = Cronbach’s alpha. Descriptive statistics were calculated
based on raw, unstandardized scores.

44

45

0.22
0.28
0.34
0.35

Insight
Figural Rebus
Verbal Rebus
Anagrams
Design Fluency
Ruff Fluency
Letter F
Animals
Circles
Incomplete Pics
Unusual Uses
Consequences

Operation Span
Running Span
Symmetry Span
Rotation Span

0.21
0.39
0.19
0.23

FigReb
1
0.66
0.43
0.34
0.08
0.39
0.31
0.35
0.30
0.18
0.22
0.22
0.40
0.21
0.24

VerbReb
1
0.53
0.29
-0.01
0.33
0.31
0.32
0.26
0.24
0.10
0.28
0.36
0.27
0.25

Ana
1
0.25
-0.01
0.45
0.28
0.14
0.20
0.15
0.13
0.13
0.25
0.20
0.17

DesFlu
1
0.52
0.38
0.41
0.24
0.36
0.21
0.24
0.05
0.10
0.13
0.07

Ruff
1
0.22
0.30
0.12
0.27
0.05
0.14
0.21
0.27
0.08
0.03

LetterF
1
0.36
0.13
0.29
0.12
0.22

Note. N = 196. Factor correlations are highlighted in bold font.

Insight
1
0.45
0.40
0.36
0.30
0.12
0.17
0.20
0.29
0.29
0.10
0.25

Pearson’s Correlations for All Tasks

Table 2

0.21
0.18
0.13
0.19

Animals
1
0.20
0.25
0.19
0.27
0.09
0.18
0.06
0.11

Circles
1
0.37
0.21
0.20
0.09
0.16
0.11
0.08

IncomPics
1
0.27
0.33
0.09
0.08
-0.04
-0.05

Uses
1
0.35
0.05
0.18
0.04
0.00

Conseq
1
1
0.45
0.56
0.51

Oper
-

1
0.29
0.37

Run
-

1
0.67

Symm
-

1

Rot
-

Table 3
Model Fit Statistics Across Analysis Sets I-IV
Set I
Set II

Set III

Set IV

Model
1A
1B
2A
2B
2C
2D
3A
3B
3C
4A
4B
4C
4D
4E
4F
4G

Df
20
19
18
15
15
11
50
50
49
97
96
96
95
97
97
96

AIC
4246.00
4218.72
4125.40
4123.19
4127.84
4125.27
6117.24
6090.58
6087.71
8162.29
8145.41
8150.27
8117.77
8167.01
8165.65
8130.12

BIC
4298.43
4274.45
4184.40
4192.03
4196.68
4207.22
6209.03
6182.37
6182.78
8290.13
8276.54
8281.40
8252.17
8294.86
8293.49
8261.25

CFI
0.86
0.97
0.96
0.97
0.96
0.98
0.89
0.93
0.94
0.87
0.89
0.88
0.92
0.86
0.86
0.90

RMSEA
0.10
0.05
0.07
0.06
0.07
0.06
0.09
0.07
0.07
0.08
0.07
0.08
0.06
0.08
0.08
0.07

SRMR
0.07
0.05
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.03
0.14
0.08
0.06
0.09
0.08
0.09
0.07
0.13
0.12
0.09

χ2
56.40
27.15
33.08
24.88
29.52
18.95
122.92
96.25
91.39
216.04
197.17
202.03
167.53
220.76
219.40
181.88

χ2 p
0.000
0.101
0.016
0.052
0.014
0.062
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Note. For each analysis set, models are organized from the most parsimonious model to
the most complex model (as indicated by the decreasing degrees of freedom). Model
names highlighted in bold font indicate the best-fitting model within each analysis set.
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Figure 2.
A priori path diagrams representing the dimensionality of divergent
thinking and fluency.
DT = divergent thinking ability; Flu = fluency ability; Circles = Torrance Test of
Creativity—circles task; IncomPic = Torrance Test of Creativity—incomplete figures;
News = unusual uses task—newspaper; Fly = consequences task—humans flying;
DesignFlu = design fluency; Ruff = Ruff figural fluency; Letter F = letter fluency;
Animals = category fluency.
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Figure 3.
A priori path diagrams representing the relationships between divergent
thinking and creative problem solving.
Bolded lines emphasize cross-loadings between factors. For cases in which two factor
loadings are provided beneath a manifest variable, the first value represents the loading
from the factor on the left, and the second value represents the loading from the factor on
the right. CPS = creative problem-solving ability; Insight = classic insight task; FigReb =
figural Rebus puzzle task; VerbReb = verbal Rebus puzzle task.
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Figure 4.
A priori path diagrams representing individual differences in divergent
thinking and creative problem solving.
Single-headed arrows originating from outside of the model and pointing to a factor
indicate the residual variance of that factor. WM = working memory capacity; Ospan =
operation span task; Runspan = running span task; SymmSpan = symmetry span task;
RotSpan = rotation span task.
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Figure 5.
A priori path diagrams representing individual differences in divergent
thinking and creative problem solving.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
When Guilford (1959, 1967) coined the terms divergent thinking and convergent
thinking, he referred to the processes that are active when generating multiple solutions
or a single solution, respectively. In addition, he suggested that divergent thinking tapped
into creative processes, whereas convergent thinking tapped into more analytic, deductive
processes. Drawing upon Guilford’s ideas, Wallach and Kogan (1965) suggested
potential cognitive mechanisms involved in these tasks. They suggested that attentional
control processes are involved in deducing single solutions and that associative processes
are involved in idea generation. These ideas remained the dominant perspective in the
literature for many years, which is why two traditions of creativity research emerged: one
which utilizes divergent thinking tasks and one which utilizes creative problem-solving
tasks.
More recent evidence has suggested that creative problem-solving and divergent
thinking tests may draw upon both divergent and convergent processes in order to
perform successfully on either type of task (Benedek & Jauk, 2017; Gilhooly, et al.,
2007; Lee & Therriault, 2013). For example, on the unusual uses for a newspaper task,
dual process theorists would propose that spreading activation is necessary for
individuals to access remote associates in memory (Mednick, 1962) and that controlled
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attention processes are necessary for choosing the most creative ideas that become active
(Beaty & Silvia, 2012).
Four sets of analyses explored whether divergent thinking and creative problemsolving tasks draw upon dual-processes using a large-scale, structural equation modeling
approach. The results of Analysis Sets I and II indicate that fluency, divergent thinking,
and creative problem-solving tasks do not stem from a single construct, but represent
three independent sets of measures, as they are treated in the literature. The results of
Analysis Sets III and IV indicated that dual processes best explain performance on the
creative thinking tasks because working memory and fluency are both key mechanisms
that influence performance on these tasks above and beyond that explained by taskspecific constructs.
In Analysis Set I, the relationship between fluency and divergent thinking
measures was investigated. Fluency tasks are often used as a measure of memory
retrieval, while divergent thinking tasks are used as a measure of creativity. Both require
individuals to produce many correct responses. The surface similarities between these
two tasks have concerned researchers in the past (Lee & Therriault, 2013; Nusbaum &
Silvia, 2011). Thus, the first analysis investigated whether they were isomorphic or
distinct. The results of this analysis indicated that the cognitive processes involved in
performing successfully on these two types of tasks are indeed independent from, but
related to, each other.
The results in Analysis Set II mirrored those in the prior set. We investigated
whether divergent thinking and creative problem-solving tasks represent a single, unified
construct or two distinct constructs. This stage of analysis was motivated by the ideas put
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forth by the dual-process theorists (Benedek & Jauk, 2017; Gilhooly, et al., 2007; Lee &
Therriault, 2013), who suggest that divergent and convergent thinking skills may
contribute to performance on either or both types of creative thinking tasks, while still
retaining some unique qualities. Again, the results of this analysis indicated that the
different types of assessments indeed represent distinct constructs. Neither type of
creative thinking was better explained by cross-loading onto the opposite set of creative
assessments. Thus, divergent thinking and creative problem-solving tasks draw upon
processes that are unique to those assessments. Creativity research has seemed to diverge
between two traditions, in which researchers tend to use only one type of assessment in
their studies. The present work provides evidence that these tests indeed measure
different abilities, so it is important that researchers take this into consideration as they
continue exploring creative thinking.
It has been suggested that attentional-control mechanisms play a role in
performance on either divergent thinking or creative problem-solving tasks (or both;
Beaty & Silvia, 2012; Benedek & Jauk, 2017; Gilhooly, et al., 2007; Guilford, 1959,
1967; Lee & Therriault, 2013; Mednick, 1962; Wallach & Kogan, 1965), so Analysis Set
III explored working memory’s effect on both types of creative thinking. This analysis
indicated that working memory explains unique variance in divergent thinking and
creative problem-solving tasks, although it did not explain any of the shared variance
between them. This finding indicates that working memory plays a different role when
generating creative ideas or solving problems creatively. Prior research has suggested that
working memory may be necessary for implementing a controlled search through the
problem space when solving insight problems, until the point of impasse has been
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reached (Ash & Wiley, 2006). Perhaps controlled attention is not necessary during the
restructuring phase of creative problem-solving because associative processes may be
responsible for initiating spreading activation to remote ideas or solutions (Mednick,
1962), explaining why individuals report feeling surprised when they realize that they
have obtained the solution (or at least, an accurate path to solution). Similarly, the
controlled-attention theory (Beaty & Silvia, 2012, 2013; Beaty, Silvia, Nusbaum, Jauk, &
Benedek, 2014; Benedek & Jauk, 2017; Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony, & Wynn, 2007;
Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011) suggests that controlled attention is necessary for idea
generation because it allows individuals to systematically search through memory and
appropriately choose ideas relevant to the goal. Thus, it appears as though our findings
are congruent with the findings in both areas of the literature, in which working memory
plays a significant, but different, role in divergent thinking and creative problem-solving.
When fluency was introduced back into the models in Analysis Set IV, however,
the previous effect that working memory had on divergent thinking (Analysis Set III) was
clearly mediated by fluency. Some of working memory’s effect on creative problemsolving was even mediated by fluency. Fluency uniquely impacted both types of creative
thinking, replicating an effect previously shown (Lee & Therriault, 2013). Most
importantly, fluency’s presence in these models reduced the relationship between
divergent thinking and creative problem-solving. Given that working memory made no
difference in the relationship between the two creative thinking constructs in the previous
analyses, the fact that fluency made a marked difference on the shared variance between
these constructs is evidence that fluency impacts performance on creative thinking, above
and beyond that of working memory.
54

The results of the current study provide support for the dual-process theory in
creative thinking (Benedek & Jauk, 2017; Gilhooly, et al., 2007; Lee & Therriault, 2013).
It is evident that creative problem-solving requires the use of two mechanisms (working
memory and fluency) because each of them predicted the creative problem-solving factor
in model 4D, but the impact of dual-processes in divergent thinking are more subtle.
Based on model 4D, one could argue that divergent thinking only requires a single
mechanism instead of two because working memory did not have a direct effect on the
divergent thinking factor. However, prior experimental research has also shown that
working memory impacts verbal fluency ability (Rosen & Engle, 1997) and the selection
of different strategies on verbal fluency tasks (e.g., automatic vs. strategic memory
retrieval; Craik et al., 1996). Thus, when interpreting the findings from model 4D, it is
important to consider that working memory still impacts divergent thinking, but it does so
through its relationship with fluency. This may be because working memory plays a
similar role in divergent thinking tasks as it does in fluency tasks.
The role of dual-processes in divergent thinking was present, but more subtle than
that in creative problem solving. This finding is interpreted as highlighting some of the
differences between divergent thinking and creative problem-solving tasks. Whereas
fluency predicted both forms of creative thinking, working memory seemed to play a
different role depending on the task being completed. For example, as an individual is
thinking of words that start with the letter ‘F’ (a verbal fluency task), they may start by
constructing a network in memory that accesses smaller words first (e.g., fin, fat, for, fun)
before accessing larger, more remote words (e.g., function, favorite, favorable). They
may even develop strategies to help them produce more responses (Craik et al., 1999). As
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more options for solution paths are accessed in memory, working memory can allow the
individual to maintain memory of responses already provided, rejected, or considered,
while inhibiting access to those responses previously deemed irrelevant to the task’s goal
(Moscovitch, 1995). If attention is diverted, remote associates or ideas may become
automatically active, making remote ideas more accessible. It is likely that a similar
process is used for approaching divergent thinking problems, although these problems
also require that individuals break away from typical responses in order to provide
creative ones. Because divergent thinking tasks emphasize quality over quantity of
responses, controlled processes, such as response maintenance and goal-directed
strategies, may play a lesser role in success; associative processes, on the other hand, will
necessarily play more of a role in allowing remote solutions to be accessed and retrieved.
This distinction between divergent thinking and fluency tasks also sheds light on why
they represent different constructs, even though people may initially approach and solve
them using similar methods. Finally, on creative problem-solving tasks, such as a Rebus
puzzle, associative processes will allow them to construct a network of potentially
relevant idioms using the particular images or verbal clues provided in the problem as a
starting guide. Working memory will play a large role at this stage, allowing the solver to
conduct a controlled search through the problem space and to determine whether
accessed idioms are consistent with the problem goals. After completing the search of all
the potential paths to solution from the problem representation (i.e., reaching impasse),
associative processes will again be necessary to allow the solver to access additional,
goal-relevant solutions. Thus, all three types of tasks (fluency, divergent thinking, and
creative problem-solving) require the use of associative and controlled processes (or
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divergent and convergent thinking, respectively), but to different extents, for different
purposes, and in different stages.
One area that would be interesting to explore in future work is how analytic
problem solving interacts with each of these constructs. If fluency truly plays a special
role in creative thinking abilities, then it should not play a role in analytic problemsolving performance. Recent work (Chuderski & Jastrze̜ bski, 2018) has used factor
analysis to explore these two types of problem solving, though in the absence of
divergent thinking and fluency measures. Future studies should implement both groups of
tasks and explore these relationships further. Likewise, factor analysis is an effective
method of extracting shared variance from a set of tasks to represent a process-pure
construct but does not allow for strong causal arguments. Future work should expand
upon these findings by using experimental methods to closely monitor and analyze which
aspects of problem solving or divergent thinking are impacted by fluency and working
memory.
Prior to the current study, only a small number of studies have investigated
divergent thinking and creative problem-solving tasks simultaneously. The present study
expanded on their work, building and comparing multiple sets of a priori models, each
representing a different theory about the underlying mechanisms involved in creative
thinking. This method allowed for previously unanswered questions to be tested directly,
such as whether verbal fluency and divergent thinking tasks represent the same construct
or how cognitive mechanisms interact in the context of multiple creative tasks. In
addition, care was taken to ensure that an adequate number of tasks from a variety of
modalities were employed. Thus, each factor was as representative as possible of the
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tasks used commonly in the literature and the abilities that they aim to measure. By
assessing multiple forms of creativity with other, more process-oriented measures, the
present work provides a clear picture of multiple processes working together to promote
creativity. Not only does this support the dual-process perspective of creative thinking,
but it also suggests that creativity is anything but “business as usual.”
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